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Heintz: Ohio Restores the Death Penalty

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO
FURMAN v. GEORGIAOHIO RESTORES THE DEATH PENALTY
For bodilie punishments we allow amongst us
none that are inhumane Barbarous or cruel.

No. 46,

MASSACHUSETTS BODY

OF LIBERTIES, Circa 1641.1

T

the first inclusion of a prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments in any charter of any colony in the New
World. Believed to be traceable to the Magna Charta, such a prohibition
is now embodied in our eighth amendment. It has been the subject of2
much litigation and construction, most recently in Furman v. Georgia,
where the death penalty, as then imposed, was declared to be invalid as
cruel and unusual. Some states, including Ohio, have responded with new
statutes controlling imposition of the death penalty in order to circumvent
the Furman proscriptions. 3 Only time will tell whether this goal will in
fact be accomplished; however some indications may be drawn from
examination of the new statutes in light of both the pre-Furman and
the Furman rationale.
HE ABOVE REPRESENTS

THE PRE-FURMAN DECISIONS
A basic difficulty in dealing with the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the eighth amendment is defining what is meant by "cruel and
unusual." Such a provision was not considered crucial enough to be
placed in the body of the Constitution. Further, the extent of the debates
concerning its inclusion in the Bill of Rights leads to a rather one sided
conclusion. Mr. Holmes, a delegate to the Massachusetts Convention
which considered ratification of the Bill of Rights, spoke of "racks and
gibbets."' 4 Patrick Henry, at the Virginia Convention, spoke of "barbarous
punishments." ' 5 It is clear then that the framers intended to ban tortuous
punishments, but beyond this, the legislative history of the eighth
amendment is of little aid. Perhaps because of this expressed intent, the
early cases dealing with it were limited in their inquiry to what was cruel
and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, 6 and as a result,
I B. ScHwARTz, THE BILL OF RiGiTS, A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 77 (1971).
2408 U.S. 238 (1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Furman].

3 See text accompanying notes 52-55 infra.
4 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrruTION 111 (1888).
5 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447 (1888).
0 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133 (1870).

[149]
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placed more emphasis on the fact that tortuous punishments were
prohibited. 7 The prohibition was also held to apply only to national
8
legislation, and not to the states.
The first major change in this approach came in Weems v. United
States.9 There the court held unconstitutional as cruel and unusual a
sentence of 15 years' hard labor for falsification of public documents. The
10
The Court shifted its
crime involved an amount of 612 pesos.
"[t]ime works changes,
saying
by
construction of the eighth amendment
and brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a
condition, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth."''
The Court continued in this vein in Trop v. Dulles," where it held
expatriation, absent allegiance to a foreign power, a cruel and unusual
punishment.13 Plaintiff Trop had been denied a passport on grounds that
his 1944 conviction for wartime desertion stripped him of his citizenship.
The Court spoke to the death penalty question, since that is the penalty
for wartime desertion, although it was not imposed on Trop. The death
penalty was rejected as an index of punishment, but dictum in the
4
decision indicated the Court considered such penalty constitutional, on
the authority of the cases examined above.u The Court did not specifically
define "cruel and unusual punishment," holding that the eighth
amendment "... . must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
6
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'
7
Four years later, in Robinson v. Calijornia the Court further
explored the question, saying that the definition of cruel and unusual
8
punishment cannot be considered in the abstract,' but must be considered
9
in light of the crime and the law involved.' Contrary to prior holdings,
to the states through the due process
application of the eighth amendment
20
clause was apparently presumed.

The modem era in the history of imposition of capital punishment
7 In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890).
8 Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475, 480 (1866).
9217 U.S. 349 (1910).
10 Id. at 358.
lId. at 373.
12 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
13 Id. at 101-102.
'4 Id. at99.

15 See 356 U.S. at 99, n.29.
1e 356 U.S. at 101.
17 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
18ld. at 667.
19Id.
20 See, e.g., Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475, 480 (1886).
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began with a reflection of increased concern over its use and abuse. In
23
Witherspoon v. Illinois,21 the Court invalidated an Illinois statute in
force at the time of defendant's trial which provided that prospective
jurors expressing opposition to, or moral qualms about the imposition
of capital punishment could be stricken or cause. The Supreme Court
reversed Witherspoon's conviction on the basis of this statute, finding
that it fell short of the impartiality guaranteed by the sixth and
fourteenth amendments. 23
The basis of the modern era of eighth amendment attacks on capital
punishment has been discretionary sentencing statutes which allow the
trier of fact to impose either imprisonment or the death penalty without
statutorily or judicially imposed guidelines. As to this, the Witherspoon
court said, "a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital
punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express
the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death." 24 The Court noted:
One of the most important functions any jury can perform in making
such an election is to maintain a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system-a link without which the
determination of punishment could hardly reflect the evolving
25
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
The culmination of the pre-Furman era of capital punishment
litigation, and the most significant in terms of possible post-Furman
standards was the Court's reasoning2 in McGautha v. California, and its
companion case, Crampton v. Ohio. 6
McGautha dealt with an appeal by a California defendant from
a felony-murder conviction and sentence of death. He was tried along
with a co-defendant who was faced with the same charge. California's
original bifurcated trial system2 7 was used, whereby guilt or innocence
was determined first, without imposition of a penalty. The trier of fact,
either judge or jury, was then presented with evidence on the issue of
punishment, i.e., circumstances surrounding defendant's background and
U.S. 510 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Witherspoon].
38 ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 38 § 743 (1959). This provision was held to be incorporated
into its successor, ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 38 § 115(4) (d) (1967), by the Illinois Supreme
Supreme Court in People v. Hobbs, 35 Ill.2d 263, 274, 220 N.E.2d 469, 475 (1966).
23391 U.S. at 518. For a further discussion of challenges of jurors who oppose the
21391
2

death penalty see Comment, Competency of Jurors Who Have Conscientious Scruples
Against CapitalPunishment,8 WASHURN L.J. 352 (1969).
24391 U.S. at 519-520.
2Id.

at 520, n.15, citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

26402 U.S. 183 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McGautha and Crampton].
27 Cal. Penal Code § 190.1 (West 1970). For further analysis of the bifurcated trial

system see Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials, A Double Edged Sword,
66 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 327 (1971). See also Bifurcating Florida's Capital Trials: Two
Steps Are Better Than One, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 127 (1971).
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any other mitigating or aggravating factors, neither of which were
statutorily defined. Determination of penalty was left to the discretion of
the trier of fact. Pursuant to this procedure, and after both had been
found guilty of the crime, McGautha and his co-defendant presented
evidence at the penalty hearing. McGautha's co-defendant was sentenced
to life imprisonment, McGautha to death. His conviction was unanimously affirmed by the California Supreme Court, 28 and he appealed.
Crampton dealt with a defendant indicted for the murder of his
wife. Ohio's pre-Furman unitary trial procedure2 9 was used. The jury
found him guilty, made no recommendation of mercy, and he was
sentenced to death. His grounds of appeal were first, the unconstitutionality
of standardless jury sentencing, and second, that while he had the right
against self incrimination, Ohio's unitary trial procedure required that
he could exercise this right only by foregoing the right to plead his
cause on the issue of punishment, such right having been established
in Townsend v. Burke.30 This resulted, Crampton argued, in "intolerable
tension" between Constitutional rights, 31 and that this tension was
prohibited by Simmons v. United States.32
As to the claim that standardless jury sentencing as allowed in both
cases was unconstitutional, the Court said, "[w]e find it quite impossible
to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the
power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything
in the Constitution." 33 As to the practicality of applying such standards,
the Court noted that "[t]he infinite variety of cases and facets to each case
'boiler-plate' or a
would make general standards either meaningless
34
statement of the obvious that no jury would need."
As to Crampton's allegation of conflicting constitutional rights, the
Court distinguished Simmons on the ground that the fourth amendment
claim there involved was "more sensitive" than Crampton's. 5 Crampton's
forced choice between the fifth amendment rights against self incrimination
and his right to be heard on the issue of punishment under Townsend, the
36
Court said, was one that is not constitutionally impermissible.
Just one year before Furman, then, it appeared that standardless jury
28 70 Cal.2d 770,452 P.2d 650 (1969).
29 This was the familiar procedure whereby

the defendant in a capital case, if found
guilty, could be sentenced to death unless the jury recommended mercy. See former
OHIo REv. CoDE § 2901.01 (repealed 1974).
30 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
3' 402 U.S. at 211.
32 390 U.S. 377 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Simmons].
33402 U.S. at 207.
341d. at 208.
35 Id. at 211-212.
3sId. at 213.
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sentencing, regardless of whether the trial was unitary or bifurcated, was
on solid ground. As seen below however, it is precisely this aspect which
was objectionable to the Furman majority.
THE FURMAN RATIONALES
In a per curiam opinion representing the judgments of five of its
members (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Stewart, and White), the Supreme
Court in Furman v. Georgia answered the following question in the
affirmative: "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
37
The fact that each Justice
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?"
filed a separate opinion, however, made it clear that the actual basis for
the decision was not nearly so succinct as a simple yes or no.
Mr. Justice Douglas based his concurrence on the fact that capital
punishment as applied by the states at that time was unconstitutional due
to discretionary and discriminatory imposition, particularly as against
blacks, who, he pointed out, had a conviction/execution rate of 88.4%
while that of whites was 79.8%. 3 8 He found statutes which left the issue
of punishment to the discretion of the triers of fact to be discriminatory in
effect, and "not compatible with the idea of equal protection of 39the laws
that is implicit in -the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments.
Mr. Justice Stewart followed the same general line of argument,
deciding that the eighth and fourteenth amendments "cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
40
unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." He did
point out that the constitutionality of the death penalty per se was not
before the Court,4 ' as did Mr. Justice White,2 who also based his
concurrence on discretionary and infrequent imposition.43 His basic
objection was that "as the statutes before us are now administered, the
penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too
' 44
Justice White
attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.
however, came closer than any other in implying what was needed for the
future: "more narrowly defined categories" for capital crime.4
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall went beyond the
37 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972), rehearingdenied 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
38 408 U.S. at 249-250. For further statistical analysis, see Bedau,

Death Sentences in

New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 RuTGERs L. REv. 1 (1964).
39 408 U.S. at 257.
40 Id. at 310.
41 Id. at
42 Id. at

306.
310.
43 Id. at 312.
44Id. at 314.
45 Id. at 310.
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others joining in the majority opinion, and found capital punishment
unconstitutional per se. Mr. Justice Marshall found that "even if capital
punishment is not excessive, it nonetheless violates the Eighth Amendment
because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at
this time in their history." 46 Mr. Justice Brennan found that "[t]he
calculated killing of a human by the State involves, by its very nature, a
denial of the executed person's humanity," as distinguished from the
prisoner who does not lose the "right to have rights." 47
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger took issue with the argument that
the death penalty is arbitrarily imposed, claiming that such an argument
lacks "empirical support." 48 All the dissenters (Burger, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist), felt that the Court should not encroach on
what is essentially a legislative function.4 9
Of the 40 states which had provisions for capital punishment, 39
were affected by Furman to the extent that their statutes were invalidated.
In Rhode Island, which has a mandatory death sentence in only one
instance, murder in the first degree by one already under a sentence of life
imprisonment,50 Furman had no effect. California's State Supreme Court
had ruled the death penalty invalid under the California Constitution,
which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment,51 in People v. Anderson.52
Furman followed close in point of time, and reinforced this holding.
THE STATES RESPOND
Predictably, the state legislatures began expressing the intention
to reinstitute the death penalty soon after the Furman decision was
announced. Basically, the legislatures were faced with a choice: either
make the penalty mandatory in those instances where the legislators felt
it was deserved, or provide some type of workable standards to judges and
juries for use in meting out capital punishment such that discretionary
imposition could be avoided. Some states, including Ohio, chose the latter
approach,ss while others, such as Georgia, chose a combination.54
A feature common to statutes reintroducing the death penalty is use
of the bifurcated trial system discussed above.55 Combined with this is

46 d. at 360.
47 Id. at 290.
48 Id. at 399.
49 Id. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 432 (Powell, J.,

dissenting), 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50 R.I. GEN. LAws AwN. § 11-23-2 (1969).
51 CAL. CoNsT. art. I § 6.
26 Cal. 3d 628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (1972).
53
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02,2929.03 (Page 1973 Supp.).
5'
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1973).
55

See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
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a set of criteria generally called "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors.
The statutes provide that the death penalty may be imposed only
where the defendant is guilty of the capital offense, under aggravating
circumstances, and where there are no mitigating factors. Where this
situation exists, the death penalty is mandatory. In this way, the statutes
seek to avoid the Furman discretionary imposition objections.
Ohio has seven aggravating factors. They are (1) assassination of
the President, Vice President, Governor, or Lieutenant Governor, or a
candidate for one of those offices, (2) murder for hire, (3) murder to
escape accountability for another crime, (4) murder by a prisoner,
(5) murder by one with a previous conviction for murder or where
the conduct involved mass murder or attempted mass murder (two or
more people), (6) murder of a police officer, and (7) felony murder."
Ohio lists three mitigating factors, and a finding of any one precludes

imposition of the death penalty: (1) where the victim of the offense
induced or facilitated it, (2) where it is unlikely that the offense would
have been committed but for the fact that the offender was under duress,

coercion, or strong provocation, and (3) where the offense was the
product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though57 such
insanity.
condition would be insufficient to establish the defense of
Under Ohio law, the prosecution of an offender for a capital offense

involving the possible imposition of the death penalty proceeds as
follows. The indictment must specify one of the seven aggravating
58
circumstances, or the death penalty is precluded. Where the indictment

contains such specification, the bifurcated trial begins. In the first phase,
the jury considers only guilt or innocence. The offender must be found
guilty of both the offense and the aggravating factor or factors beyond

59
a reasonable doubt. If the verdict is guilty on the offense 'and not
guilty on the specification, the sentence is life imprisonment.60 If
the verdict is guilty on both the specification and the offense, the jury
is dismissed and the second phase of the bifurcated trial begins. The
penalty is determined by either the trial judge who presided over the
guilt-innocence hearing, or the three-judge panel who determined guilt or
61
innocence upon defendant's waiver of his right to trial by jury. This
phase consists of a presentence investigation, psychiatric examination, and
most importantly, a hearing at which evidence is received as to whether
62
any of the mitigating factors exist. Establishing a mitigating factor is

6 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (1-7)
57 Id. § 2929.04(b) (1-3).

(Page Supp. 1973).

58 Id. § 2929.03 (a).

59 Id. § 2929.03 (b).
60 ld. § 2929.03 (c).
611d. § 2929.03 (c) (1-2).
62ld. § 2929.03 (d),
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accomplished by a preponderance of the evidence. 63 In addition, the
offender may make a statement in his own behalf, as to punishment, and
he is subject to cross-examination only if he consents to make such
statement under oath.64 Where existence of one or more mitigating
factors is not shown by a preponderance of the evidence, the death
penalty is mandatory.6 5 Where the penalty hearing is presided over
by a three-judge panel, the determination that there are no mitigating
66
factors must be unanimous.
By this procedure, Ohio seeks to avoid the proscriptions of Furman.
Its approach is similar to, but not identical with, that of other states.
California, for example, provides that the jury decide guilt or innocence
separately from its verdict as to aggravating circumstances.6 7 More
significantly however, is the fact that the only mitigating circumstances in
California are (1) if the defendant is under 18, and (2) where the
offender was not personally present during commission of the act (except
where the aggravating factor is murder for hire).6s
Georgia makes the death penalty mandatory in cases of treason
and aircraft hijacking, regardless of whether aggravating or mitigating
circumstances exist.69 It provides further for the death penalty in cases
where no murder occurred, viz., rape, armed robbery and kidnaping, where
an aggravating factor is found by the jury.70 The death penalty is
mandatory where the aggravating factor is found, and the jury recommends
death, and it is precluded where the jury either finds no aggravating
factor, or fails to recommend death.n The Georgia statute lists aggravating
factors, 72 but while it provides that mitigating factors may be considered
by the jury73 (presumably in consideration of whether to recommend
death) none are listed. Automatic review of all death sentences by the
74
Georgia Supreme Court is provided.
Florida provides that where the jury finds the defendant guilty of
a capital felony, a separate hearing as to penalty is to be conducted with
63 Id. § 2929.03 (e).
64 Id. § 2929.03 (d).
65 Id.

6 ld.
67 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1974).
68

Id. § 190.3.

69 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (a) (Supp. 1973).
7O Id. § 27-2534.1 (b) (1,2,3,7).
71 Id. § 26-3102.
72 Id. § 27-2534.1 (b) (1-10).
73 Id. § 27-2534.1 (b).
74 Id. § 27-2537. For further analysis of Georgia's capital punishment provisions, see

Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-CapitalPunishment-Furmanv, Georgiaand Georgia's

Sfatutorv Response, 24 MERcER L, R v, 891 (1973),
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the jury passing on the questions of aggravating or mitigating factors,7h
both of which are listed. 78 The verdict of the jury is not binding on
the court however, which may weigh the evidence itself, and enter
sentence accordingly. 77 As in Georgia, automatic appeal to the state
supreme court is provided, 78 and that court recently upheld the
79
constitutionality of the new law in State v. Dixon.
VIABILITY OF THE NEW STATE LAWS
Both the Florida and Georgia statutes seem more vulnerable to the
Furman proscriptions than does the Ohio provision. Georgia avoids
discretion completely in two instances, treason and aircraft hijacking, but
provides no mitigating factors as to the other capital offenses, some of
which do not involve murder. 80 Florida's provision leaves the judge free
to impose sentence as he chooses, regardless of the jury's decision as to
mitigation and aggravation. Both Florida 8 ' and Georgia 8 2 provide as an
aggravating factor the situation where the capital felony was especially
heinous or cruel, or exhibited extreme depravity. These nebulous terms seem
to invite the very type of discretion that Furman finds objectionable.
The entire spectrum of the new Florida law was attacked in State
v. Dixon.83 The Florida Supreme Court found all aspects of it constitutional, and a discussion of parts of the opinion serves a useful purpose
here in that it demonstrates the problems other courts may encounter when
construing statutes drafted along similar lines. 84 As pointed out above, two
of the most questionable aspects of the Florida statute are (1) the fact
that the trial court is not bound 'by the determination of the jury as to
aggravation and mitigation, and (2) the fact that one of the aggravating
specifications is couched in terms of whether the capital crime was
heinous or cruel. As to the former, the Dixon court found that it was to
the advantage of the defendant, in that the experienced trial judge
... possesses the requisite knowledge to balance the facts of the case
against the standard of criminal activity which can only be developed
by involvement with the trials of numerous defendants. Thus the

75

FLA.

STAT. ANN.

§921.141(1)

(1973), as amended (Supp. 1974).

921.141 (5), 921.141(6).
77 Id.§ 921.141(3).
78 Id. § 921.141 (4).
79 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
80 E.g., aggravated rape, GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (b) (7) (1973).
81 FLA. STAT. ANN. §921.141(5) (h) (1973), as amended (Supp. 1974).
76 Id.§§

CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (7) (Supp. 1973); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6(3) (h) (proposed draft, 1963).
83 283 So. 24 1 (Fla. 1973).
84 For a further critique of the Florida law, see Ehrhardt, et al, The Aftermath of
Furman: The FloridaExperience, 64 J. CIM. LAW 2 (1973).
82 GA.
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inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer sentence a man
to die;
85
the sentence is viewed in the light of judicial experience.
This seems to be a rather one-sided analysis. Aside from the fact that a
trial judge is also potentially subject to his emotions, the court seems to be
ratifying the addition of a step in the criminal process heretofore not
extant. No longer does the defendant have the clear-cut choice of a trial
before a jury of his peers or before the court. Rather the Florida defendant is faced with a judicial mutant; he is tried 'by both the jury and the
judge. It is submitted that this places an additional burden on the defendant, particularly in light of the fact that the trial judge is exposed to all
evidence proffered by the state, admissible or not, while the jury is exposed
only to that evidence which meets the tests set out by law. It appears that
the axiom, the jury decides the facts and the judge decides the law, is no
longer applicable in Florida, with resulting detriment to the accused.
As to the second questionable area of the Florida law, viz., the
nebulous terminology of one of the aggravating circumstances,8 the Dixon
court applied the following rationale. "Heinous" was defined by the court
as "extremely wicked or shockingly evil," "atrocious" as "outrageously
wicked and vile," and "cruel" as "designed to inflict a high degree of pain
with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others."8'
It is submitted that this type of literary legerdemain confuses rather than
clarifies the issue. The court's contention that the above terms are "a
matter of common knowledge, so that an ordinary man would not have
to guess at what was intended," 88 in reality begs the question, and does
little to meet the discretion-free requirements of Furman.
As to the Ohio statute, several questions arise, both as to the Ohio
provision specifically, and as to the aggravating/mitigating factor/bifurcated trial reaction to Furman in general.
One objection to the Ohio statute specifically is its provision that
during the penalty hearing, the offender may make a statement, subjecting
himself to cross examination only if he chooses to make such statement
under oath. However, the Court in McGautha held that one who testifies
in his own behalf cannot later avoid cross examination on matters
reasonably related to the subject of his direct testimony.89 Given the
present atmosphere of the Court, it is questionable whether this oath-no
oath distinction will be permitted to stand.
Similar to the Florida situation, the most basic objection to the Ohio

85 283 So. 2d at 8.
86FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (1973), as amended (Supp. 1974) states "The
capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."
87 283 So. 2d at 9.
88 Id.
8 402 U.S. at 215.
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provision deals with one of the aggravating factors. While Ohio did not
include the nebulous "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" specification, questions
do arise concerning the one which provides for the death penalty when
".... the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the
purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more people."' 9
The most obvious objection is that it opens the door for imposition
of the death penalty where no murder has in fact occurred, though
admittedly such use of the statute would be unusual. Far more important
to the practitioner, however, is the use to which this section has been put
since the law became effective in January, 1974. Of the cases which have
arisen under the new law, the mass murder aggravating factor has often
been specified, 91 yet in at least two instances, the crime involved the actual
killing of only one person, 92 and in one of these cases there is some
question as to whether there was in fact a bona fide attempt to kill
93
the others present.
The impact of possible misuse of this aggravating factor is twofold.
First is the obvious effect on the plea bargaining process. Where the
defendant is originally charged with aggravated murder, as opposed to a
lesser included offense, simply because there was more than one person
present at the incident the relative bargaining positions of the prosecutor
and defense counsel are further apart. More importantly, while an
obvious misuse of the mass murder aggravating factor can be dismissed
at trial for lack of proof, the jury has already been exposed to the
possibility of the death penalty, and has begun to think of punishment
at a higher level than would ordinarily be the case. Where plea
bargaining is not a viable possibility then, it is to the obvious advantage
of defense counsel to attempt dismissal of the aggravating specification
at the pre-trial stage.
As to the post-Furman approach in general, more serious questions
arise. First, the aggravating/mitigating factors set up by the new laws
call to mind the system which was rejected in McGautha as "meaningless
boiler-plate."94 It can be argued that the jury is still free to interpret
the standards as they please, with the result that there is no meaningful
change from the pre-Furman situation.
Further, none of the new laws deal with one area of discretion which

9 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (5) (Page Supp. 1973).

91See, e.g., State v. Samples, No. 74-2-133 (Summit County C.P. 1974); State v.
Bayless, No. 74-3-244 (Summit County C.P. 1974); State v. Pileggi, No. 74-4190
(Stark County C.P. 1974).
92 State

v. Samples, No. 74-2-133 (Summit County C.P. 1974); State v. Pileggi, No.

74-4190 (Stark County C.P. 1974).
93

In Samples the other person present was defendant's estranged wife, with whom he
claimed he wanted a reconciliation.
94 402 U.S. at 208.
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is still unchecked, i.e., the prosecutorial discretion as to original charge in
the pre-trial stage. This line of reasoning was not advanced to the Court
in Furman. However, a firm position as to discretionary imposition was
taken in that case, and should a significant correlation be shown, for
example between race and indictment under the new laws, the Court will
be faced with the effects of the same type of discretion it found
objectionable when in the hands of the jury. This point is of particular
significance in Ohio, where, in order for capital punishment to be in
issue, the indictment must specify one or more aggravating factors,9 5 at
least one of which is subject to abuse as discussed above. Likewise under
the new laws, the judge, while not free to impose the death penalty,
may, in his discretion, withhold it depending on his construction of
the mitigating factors involved. 96
The answer to all three of these arguments is of course, that
discretion is an inextricable element of the law. This was in fact the
position taken by the Florida Supreme Court in holding the Florida
statute constitutional in Dixon, where it said, "[d]iscretion and judgement
are essential to the judicial process at all stages of its progression-arrest,
arraignment, trial, verdict, and onward through final appeal.'
In light
of Furman however, it cannot be assumed that areas of discretion of
such magnitude as to have the same effect as the prohibited jury
discretion will be sustained by the Court.
Perhaps then, the only acceptable form of capital punishment is
where it is mandatory, as in California, where there are no mitigating
factors save age and absence from the scene of the crime (and only then
when murder for hire is not involved),gs and in Georgia as to treason and
aircraft hijacking. 99 This is a harsh result however, and would still be
unacceptable to those who view capital punishment as unconstitutional
per se. Two members of the Court are already of this view. Further,
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Furman, stated that if the death
sentence could be avoided only by a verdict of acquittal of the capital
' z°
offense, "I would have preferred that the Court opt for total abolition."'
Thus one inference for the future is that should the Court find that the

9

5

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (A) (Page Supp. 1973).

These arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Jefferson v.
Commonwealth- ...... Va ....... 204 S.E.2d 258 (1974), on the grounds that Furman
applies only to the exercise of discretion in fixing punishment. But see Douglas, J.,
concurring, 408 U.S. at 251, and Stewart, J., concurring, 408 U.S. at 310, as to
constitutional impermissibility of the imposition of capital punishment on the basis
of race; see also Marshall, J., concurring, 408 U.S. at 358-59, and Brennan, J.,
concurring, 408 U.S. at 290, as to the per se unconstitutionality of capital punishment.
96

97283 So. 2d at 16.
98

CAL.

PENAL CODE

§ 190.3 (West Supp. 1974).

99 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1973).
100 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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systems of standards enacted by the states do not result in less discretionary
imposition, leaving mandatory imposition the only alternative, total
abolition, except for such offenses as assassination, is a probable result.
Ohio will not have long to wait for the answer. Several cases involving
aggravated murder under the new Code are now pending.' 0 ' If one thing
is clear however, it is that Furman v. Georgia is not the final word on
capital punishment. It appears to be only the beginning of yet another
era in the history of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
JEFFREY T. HEINTZ

Several of the cases arising under the new Ohio law have resulted in imposition of
the death sentence on the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Bayless, No. 74-3-244 (Summit
County C.P. 1974).
101
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